THE SENATOR ROBB, JUDGE SILBERMANN WHITEWASH

by
Larry C. Johnson

"Dead wrong" is the phrase the media is trumpeting from the report issued by former Senator Chuck Robb and Judge Laurence Silbermann under the title , Final Report on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Hopefully most Americans will take time to read the report and understand what a woeful, inept job that Robb and Silbermann have done. I agree with the Commission report that analysts made mistakes. But for all of the massive detail provided in the 600 plus page report, Robb and Silbermann fail to answer the most basic question: Was there any intelligence analysis from the CIA that indicated Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction had reached the point that if we did not act Saddam would? The answer is no. Yet, Robb and Silbermann want Americans to accept the nonsense that politics played no role in the intelligence analysis. They ask America to accept the sorry picture of a President and legislators who apparently were willing idiots being spoon fed wrong information by incompetent analysts. If we accept this fairy tale we will have learned nothing from the fiasco in Iraq.

But do not take my word for it. Consider what is presented in the Chapter on the Iraq failure. According to the report the analysts said,

The pre-war estimate of Iraq’s nuclear program, as reflected in the October 2002 NIE Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, was that, in the view of most agencies, Baghdad was “reconstituting its nuclear weapons program” and “if left unchecked, [would] probably…have a nuclear weapon during this decade,” although it would be unlikely before 2007 to 2009. The NIE explained that, in the view of most agencies, “compelling evidence” of reconstitution was provided by Iraq’s “aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes.” The NIE also pointed to additional indicators, such as other dual-use procurement activity, supporting reconstitution. The assessment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program and could therefore have a weapon by the end of the decade was made with “moderate confidence.”

Yes the analysts were wrong. They believed that Iraq was reconstituting the nuke program. But there were important caveats. First, Iraq would only have a nuke if left "unmolested" to develop such a capability. That is not codeword for invasion. Second, even if left unmolested Iraq would not have acquired a nuke until at least 2007. And how strong was this judgment? The analysts made it with "moderate confidence". It was the policymakers, not the analysts, who made the decision to go to war and who misrepresented to the public what the estimate actually said.

I am not saying the CIA is free of blame. There were major mistakes of leadership. For example, the man who led the drafting of the October 2002 estimate surrounded himself with true believers who shared the view of Bush Administration policymakers at the NSC and Department of Defense that military action in Iraq was required. This National Intelligence Officer created obstacles to dissident voices within the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community from being heard. But to pretend that the flaws in the intelligence explains why President Bush took us to war requires that we ignore a host of other uncomfortable facts.

CIA analysts got it right on the lack of operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Yet, notwithstanding the correct judgment of the analysts, President Bush and Vice President Cheney have continued to insist that there was such a relationship. In their words, the war in Iraq was an extension of the war on terrorism.

Analysts also got it right on the alleged link between Iraq and Niger on the question of uranium. The analysts who briefed Congress in October 2002 said there was no truth to the allegation. Yet, the White House wanted to run with it. We know from a previous Congressional report that the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence asked George Tenet in early October 2002 to intervene with the White House, who insisted on putting the Iraq/Niger allegation in the President's speech in Cincinnati. Only after Tenet called Stephen Hadley was the info removed. The CIA analysts consistently warned the Administration that the info the Brits had also was unreliable and the reports of Iraq trying to get their hands on a nuke were wrong.

But the policymakers did not want to hear it. In fact, Don Rumsfeld and his minions were briefing TV and newspaper pundits just two weeks before the President's 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium in Niger.

But policymakers do not deserve all of the blame. There was a failure of leadership at CIA. Analysts were undermined by their immediate boss, George Tenet. Although Tenet had intervened to keep the erroneous material out of the Cincinnati speech he decided to take a pass when it came to the State of the Union speech. He didn't make a stink and he left it in. Worse still, he failed in his duty to tell the President truths he did not want to hear. Sharing in this debacle was the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Jamie Miscik. When an analyst reports intelligence about a newly acquire biological weapons capability in Iraq it is incumbent on those running the Agency to ask one simple question, "What is the source of this info?". During my time as an analyst I had to justify conclusions by providing an assessment of sources. My bosses, especially a DCI, could call the Directorate of Operations and get a clear read on a questionable source. In the case of Iraq, however, top CIA managers decided to go along with policymakers in trumping up the case for war rather than insisting on the integrity of the intelligence.

Here is the bottomline. There is no such thing as perfect intelligence or perfect analysis. However, we do not serve the security of this country by perpetuating the myth that we went to war in Iraq because a couple of analysts believed Saddam's acquisition of aluminum tubes was part of a secret program to build a nuke. Going to war was and remains a political decision.